surveillance-cameras-400 The NSA/GCHQ spying scandal is far reaching in both scope and the damage it has done to our liberal democracies. It is primarily a political problem, as well as being an IT security issue.

It is also, and this gives me some hope that we can beat this thing, an economic problem.

One important thing that the recently leaked black budget tells us, is what the government considers to be a reasonable price tag for the mass surveillance of every man, woman and child on the planet.

$250 million dollars per year (British figure not known at time of writing, but likely to be in a similar ballpark), is not a particularly large amount of money, and is a figure based on a number of storage and processing assumptions.

Much of the internet traffic is unencrypted and so can be processed live, the contents not stored. Encrypted traffic carries an extra processing and storage overhead; encrypted messages are kept until they can be broken, and processing resources spent trying to break them. Even if some of the algorithms used have been deliberately weakened, there is still a significant number of messages they can’t break.

The $250m/y budget is calculated based on estimates based on these assumptions.

Raising the cost of doing business

What does all this mean?

Well, what this means is that we, the citizens, have a very real way of changing the economics of mass surveillance programs like PRISM and TEMPORA, and significantly increase the price tag. Hopefully, to a level where it becomes politically and economically impractical to run them.

These programs are budgeted and resourced based on the assumption that relatively few people use hard encryption (HTTPS having been compromised), so if there was a marked increase the level of encrypted traffic going over the network, it follows that there would need to be a corresponding increase in resource expenditure in order to maintain the same level of capability. To a point, hopefully, where they are unable to keep up.

Every time you use encryption you help increase the cost of the program, and provide herd protection to your fellow citizen. Even if that encryption has been deliberately weakened, there is still a net gain for the good guys, since some processing resources will still be spent.

Additionally, since they feed data collected through various pattern analysis algorithms (in order to better profile us and to optimise resource allocation), if a significant portion of the dataset were to become unavailable, we can dramatically screw around with the baseline calculations, which may act like a force multiplier.

What I’d like to see

We need to dramatically increase the amount of encrypted traffic on the internet at large (remember, it seems that the security services have been compromising the implementations of algorithms, and sometimes the hardware and RNGs they depend on, not the algorithms themselves. Backdoors will be fixed – in free software implementations at least – and compromised hardware replaced or worked around).

I would like to see everybody making a pledge that everything they send over the internet will be encrypted. As technologist we need to take the lead on this; we have the moral duty to help protect our users, which means designing systems and networks so that they are resilient to subversion and surveillance, and to help people without technical knowledge protect themselves (friends don’t let friends use cleartext, as I’ve discussed before).

Remember, every time you send an encrypted message, you – in a small way – help protect everyone else on the planet.

Jurisdiction The other day, in response to Ben’s suggestion, I declared my data jurisdiction, so that those wishing to contact me knew exactly what risks their data could be exposed to.

It occurred to me that simply naming the jurisdiction wasn’t really much good unless I could also point to something that would explain the risks in plain English, so, the other afternoon, I took some time out and put together Data-Jurisdiction.org.

Data-Jurisdiction.org is a community project that anyone can contribute to (either by submitting a patch for, or raising an issue on, the GitHub project) so get hacking! It is my hope that as more people declare their data jurisdiction the site will become a handy source of information.

As a reminder of my jurisdiction; I am based in the UK, with servers in the US and Germany.

Today, Groklaw, a site responsible for, among other things, victory in the SCO patent troll attack on the Linux kernel, followed Lavabit and shut it’s doors. It did so because there is now no way to communicate securely on the internet; traffic is routinely intercepted, servers can be stolen and operators forced to reveal confidential sources.

This is the world we live in, and have been living in for a while now, but thanks to a whistleblower we are all forced to confront this reality.

So, as technologists, what can we do to protect ourselves and our loved ones?

Truth is there is no silver bullet, but that doesn’t mean we just give up and go home. While the technology is only a small part of the issue here, it is something that we as technologists and makers are in a position to do things about.

While we work to solve the political problems that have caused this current situation, I think that we need to work towards making cryptography ubiquitous. Analysis of some of the leaked material already suggests that if the level of cryptographic content was raised, it would raise the cost of analysis by government agencies to an impractical level, and at the very least we’d remove “use of encryption” as grounds for suspicion.

When we build systems we need to decentralise, so there’s no one server and operator to intimidate. We need to protect content and metadata, because who talked to whom, and where, is still sensitive information. We need to work on the UX of the systems that are available, so that cryptography isn’t something someone who just wants to use the computer needs to think about. Think of these sorts of things as safety equipment, like seat belts or airbags. They should just work, without the operator having a degree.

Don’t be this guy.

We needed to think about this stuff before the first sharpie hit the paper.

Coulda, shoulda, woulda….

In the mean-time, we need to use the tools that we have. Make security and cryptography ubiquitous. As technologists, we have the knowledge to protect ourselves (and if you’re not already, you’ve got no excuse), but we also have a duty to help our friends, neighbours and family as well.

So, encourage your friends to use encrypted email and OTR messaging on IM, explain why it’s important while helping them install and use the plugin. Install HTTPS Everywhere on your mum’s computer. Talk to your neighbours about the dangers of the guilt by association fallacy in relation to communication metadata while installing the TOR browser bundle on their laptop.

You get the idea, friends don’t let friends use cleartext!