6a0120a85dcdae970b016301e98de2970d-800wi

So, following on from the theme of other week’s post, this is a very quick plugin which will opportunistically encrypt email sent by Known.

It works in much the same way as the similar WordPress code; if a key for a user is in the keyring, the email is encrypted before it is sent. It is particularly handy when combined with my PGP Signin code, since that will provide key discovery.

I wrote this for my own use, so it’s not perfect. For example, since Known sends all email as HTML (unless my plain text email patch is also applied this patch was merged into core), my plugin currently just strips tags, which at least makes the email somewhat readable.

Anyway, kick it around.

» Visit the project on Github...

So, the other week I told you about the improvements to my access logging tool, which will now keep a user by user track of account activity.

This tool also makes a call to a GeoIP lookup hook, but until now remained unanswered. So, I wrote a quick tool that implements this GeoIP lookup hook using PHP’s built in geoip functions.

Once installed and configured (and the appropriate GeoIP database set up), this plugin will respond to any geoip/lookup event requests by looking up ['ip' => '....'] and returning the a country.

If installed along side LoginSyslog, you should start seeing the country listed along side the IP address!

» Visit the project on Github...

Just a quick one…. I noticed in my webserver logs, a whole bunch of directory walk “script kiddie” exploit attempts to various wordpress sites on my server, attempting to retrieve my wordpress configuration file: wp-config.php.

A directory walk attack is where someone will attempt to use a download feature of some plugin or other in attempt to trick it to retrieve a different file, by passing ../ before the file name. E.g.

None of these exploits was successful, since this is an obvious approach which should be sanitised out of inputs, but part of having a secure system is the concept of strength in depth and every programmer makes mistakes.

So, I knocked together a quick modsecurity rule:

Which seems to shut this one exploit down. HTH :)